in contradistinction to persona 'person'. Mere humanity did not refer positive rights or their ground. It was in principle excluded from legal •·.·'C~•rtsiideJrati.ons. Indeed, what became 'crimes against humanity' were first Cl1ar•acteri:sed as 'crimes against Christianity '. 93 By their inclusion in the •Nun,mlber·g Charter, the court was able to have unprecedented jurisdicover unprecedented crimes committed against German jews by own government.
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Larry May's conception of crimes against humanity is probably the well known. It describes protective and security principles as underlying the international jurisdiction over the crimes. May's approach, however, does not really take into account the normative and descriptive elements of the law where 'humanity' has both qualitative and quantitative elements. Christopher Macleod, 95 for one, identifies a .certain ambiguity of the term 'humanity', which can refer either to a species or to the quality of being humane, i.e. humaneness. 96 Macleod helpfully reviews eight different conceptions of crimes against humanity in the relevant literature. In the end, he favours a definition where 'an action is a crime against humanity if and only if it is a crime that damages humankind ': 97 very literally, an offence committed against humanity as such. 98 This comes at some cost, though, because the author readily admits to making humanity a metaphysical object. 99 How it makes the transition from the metaphysical to the physical is the subject of this chapter. The chapter examines the divergence and convergence of the theory and practice of international criminal justice in order to provide a factual, textual, and legal background that sketches out its redemptive sacrificial economy. Synthesising some common themes encountered in the subject area (including global politics, exemplary trials, communityformation via exclusion and inclusion, secular and religious mystification, symbolism, and perpetual promise), this chapter's thesis is that international criminal law processes embody the international community through iconic presentation. The phrase hostis humani generis or enemy of all mankind has been identified as being at the very beginning of international criminal law. Luigi Corrias observes that merely by virtue of invoking crimes against humanity its perpetrators are designated hastes humani generi. Dan Edelstein, taking a philological approach, 44 EDWIN BIKUNDO traces the phrase's various guises and transmutations from its origins in classical antiquity, through to early Christianity, the French Revolution to late politics and law. 100 The phrase has been used to describe not just pirates but everything from the devil to tyrants, and even kings. Essentially its purpose is twofold: first, to provide jurisdiction where there would otherwise be none, and, second; it occasionally serves to dehumanise anyone to whom the epithet is applied. According to Giorgio Agamben, the gesture of sacrifice presents a theurgical aspect, in that humans act ritually on the gods in order effectively to create them. 101 For Giorgio Agamben, sacrifice provides a mythical foundation for society rather than the fact of mere action without any actual grounding.'
02 It supplies the fiction of a beginning for a community, which beginning by a simultaneous exclusion and inclusion excludes what, in reality, is the entire foundation of communallife.' 03 This chapter's core argument is therefore that a counterpart phrase hostia humani generis or sacrifice for all mankind would have explanatory value indicating as it does that those accused of crimes against humanity are also tried for and on behalf of redeeming all of humanity.
As van der Wilt notes, from the perspective of international criminal law there is no fundamental disagreement with disciplines like bioethics as to the conceptual content of humanity. In the introduction, Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias and Wouter Werner point out how biolaw traces its birth .from medical-ethical concepts developed during the trial of Nazi physicians and researchers. International criminal justice is here portrayed as a legal-political apparatus for not just generating justice and protection for humanity but also fostering humaneness.
International criminal law's contribution to this anthropological machine is the constant generation of social scapegoats through a sacrificial economy. The chapter stages an engagement between international criminal law and an innovative theoretical framework, essentially sketching out an iconography of the criminal trial as being dependent upon a sacrificial economy. these in a court that was set up, it is said, to punish those most ·::\'e:sp,onismte for 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international j'qprrtmuniity as a whole' that 'deeply shock the conscience ofhumanity '. 105 with this rhetorical claim, surely the proper scholarly attitude then only be an inquisitively open-minded scepticism towards Africans : _ lw.ving a near monopoly of these crimes and prescribing select criminal as being the panacea. This chapter casts a critical eye at two ''""'ar''ntlv unrelated fields of inquiry, both addressing an ethical gap be:tween the theory and the practice of international criminal justice. The regards a certain ethical ambivalence about whether a criminal trial •: ••l,;nn on individual criminal responsibility can prevent the recurrence mass violence. The second highlights the ethical ambiguity of how a universal court, designed and intended to prosecute those most responsible for the worst crimes known to humanity, only has cases from a single continent whether by coincidence or not. The problematic link between those otherwise unrelated questions in the context of inter-:pational criminal justice is the continent and peoples of Africa. In theory, ~~least as per the rhetoric of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, j:he establishment of the ICC in 1998 was a historical moment gifting hope to future generations, and a great step towards universalising human rights and the rule of law.
106 Annan, quoting Marcus Tullius Cicero's declaration that 'in the midst of arms, law stands mute' (inter armes silent leges), said that there was now real hope that Cicero's cynicism would be less justifiable in the future than it had been in the past. 107 According to Annan, until the moment establishing the ICC, when powerful men committed crimes against humanity, they had known 'that as long as they remained powerful no earthly court could judge them'. Indeed, even when they were judged here on earth (as happened in 1945) they could protest that it was merely a form of vengeance: 'victors' justice'. Consequently, the accused could explain their guilt away by claiming their prosecution was really a persecution only occasioned by others who proved more powerful than they and those more powerful were in that way able to sit in judgment. At the same momentous occasion, Philippe Kirsch, the chairman of the diplomatic conference setting up the court and later a president of the ICC, concurred that setting up the court had established solid foundations of an institution that would have a major impact for future generations. According to Kirsch, the international community had acted to show that it would not stand silently by as genocide was committed. The adoption of the Statute furthermore was 'really the future of humanity in many ways'. 108 The central question structuring this piece is how do representative trials of persons accused of having the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole supposedly bind recurrent violence?
The universality and promise of international criminal justice Arguably, universal justice has tensions within and between justice and universality. The opposition within justice regards simultaneously addressing individual criminal responsibility and mass violence that implicates a substantial segment of a population. The contradiction within universality is how a court set up by the international community with the potential to cover all states, whether members of the Rome Statute or not, only has African cases even after utilising all the various means by which it may be seized of jurisdiction. This is in the context of its only being able to act where the state that would otherwise do so is either unable or unwilling to perform its prosecutorial duty. process.uo Marti Koskenniemi says that the symbolism of the international criminal trial enables the formation of a moral community.
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Koskenniemi also says that international law, although secular, has a horizon of transcendence couched in messianic language, whose present imperfections only set off its yet-to-be fulfilled promises the brighter.
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Immi Tallgren points out that international criminal justice, following the rhetoric of domestic criminal justice, sees all criminals (whether robbers or genocidaires) as having a single disease whose cure is deterrent punishment.
113 Given such rhetoric, the logic of both domestic and international criminal justice is that achieving general prevention requires 'exemplary decisions '. 114 This rhetoric and consequent logic are, however, inadequate to serve fully its expressive purpose, which is the prevention of criminality.
115 International criminal justice in this way attracts attention to itself and therefore away from what it is intended to J.<ldrc,ss. International criminal law is consequently a 'kind of religious ;seJVic:e of hope tha:t is stronger than the desire to face everyday life' that /eJoat>les the avoidance of the why question in international criminal
To put it baldly, international criminal law enables global governby simultaneously rationalising and mystifying political control. 117 · c;rolrinv" cue from Koskenniemi, Nouwen, Werner, Simpson and one of common interlocutors, Carl Schmitt, who stated that all 'significant of the modern theory of the state' are secularised theological because of their 'historical development' and 'systematic struc-I argue that the iconographic symbolism of a few representative in the Hague, an iconic city ('the legal capital of the world'), Pn~ve11t mass organised political violence, may be both irreducibly and irreducibly theological. This argument demonstrates that the iconography of international criminal justice reveals that trials in an iconic city by an iconic prosecutor have their own i.e. an economy. This is specifically a sacrificial economy linking contingent means for realising permanent ends. All that is in order to vis•uali1se; the invisible, and hear the inaudible international community through icons as embodied representations of something that has its own existence, yet which is only visible and audible through those icons.n 9 The icon sets up a relation between the visible and invisible without any respect for realism or neglect for the material. 120 The question therefore is not whether the icon is by nature or by definition true or false, or even good or bad, because its truth is derived not from itself but from its founding cause.12I The essence of the iconic image is not its vi,;ibilitv (which belongs to imagery and not to iconicity); 'it is its economy, that alone, that is visible in its iconicity '. 122 To belabour the point, rhetorical, logical and aesthetical substitution of a flesh and blood ecutor for the immaterial international community is precisely what visualises and renders audible that international community for purposes of international criminal justice. The ethical position of however, falls short of that to which it aspires.
The occurrence of post-electoral violence in Kenya is a case referred back to repeatedly in this chapter to illustrate different facets the main argument as they develop. Although it is an example from an African case before the ICC, it has general insights to coJ>tnibute that are generally applicable to evaluating other courts and trilmn.als, both historical and contemporary. According to the ICC prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, the leadership of Kofi Annan was essential for office 123 A practical illustration of the working of the Court pursuant l!eth<,Orv of universal justice was when Annan, in his capacity as African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities, to the ICC prosecutor a sealed envelope containing a list of allegedly implicated in post-electoral violence occurring in Annan explained that in Kenya there was no opposition a truth commission and justice and suggested a three-pronged with the ICC prosecuting those most responsible, national nt,tbility proceedings for other perpetrators, as well as reforms such as the Truth, justice and Reconciliation to this prompting from Annan, the ICC prosecutor subsesaid more than once that Kenya would be an example to the /interna·tioJnal community on managing and preventing recurrent violence:
126
Prosecutor emphasized that Kenya would prove an example of how Work together v.rith the international community and the Court to end ilmpurtity and prevent future crimes. 'Kenya will show how to manage violence and how to create a peaceful process for the upcoming ,,--------in 2012. Kenya will be an example to the world.' ... 'We all agree impunity is not an option,' he stressed, 'and that to prevent new in 2012 it is necessary to prosecute those responsible for the crimes \Prnmdtt<'d during the post election violence.' 127 it was the Kenyan government itself that originated the idea in place of using international criminal prosecutions to prevent the of political violence:
#grtrding Kenya, I met on 3 July v.rith a Government delegation from led by Justice Minister Kilonzo. They informed me that, in order •Prose·cut:or: Kenya Can Be an Example to the World'. 
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For one thing, preventative exemplification to prevent mass violence problematic because the law only provides the court with j't tri,:dic:tion over natural persons who are to be individually responsible and liable punishment without allowing corporate or group liability. 129 The tion of accused, however, does seem to be with a view to how exemplify acts committed en masse and in concert. Indeed, the prosecutor has assured that the 'persons bearing the greatest responsi~'. bility for the most serious crimes are being brought to justice'. therefore does the ICC prosecutor mean when he constantly repeats refrain that the Kenya situation would be an example supposedly to prevent recurring violence. Did the then prosecutor speak literally literarily? Is peace a cause or an effect of justice? A literal analysis the trial process would only reveal an individual in jeopardy of his or own life, liberty or property. This, bar a mysterious link, does not directly translate to communal peace. How does one prosecute their way peace? Perhaps there is some indirect analogical relation amenable elucidation.
A literary or figurative analysis by contrast to a literal one could · individual trials to communal peace, precisely through analogy making an example of the accused to other potential accused. The is that there is neither empirical proof nor factual analysis relied on referred to linking peace and criminal trial, only hopes, promises, suppositions, assumptions and, central to this chapter, ritualised coiimlct. Indeed interlocutors such as the then prosecutor are not concerned the actual reality of their intended results but only with their meaning terms of iconicity to the various constituencies of international crimilnal. justice. The then prosecutor and the Kenyans therefore speak of than merely law and to understand those statements better we need rely on more than a purely legal analysis of the pacifying pn:ve11tal:ive exemplar being brought to bear.
The example as a category is used for reasoning analogically comparing a particular case to a particular case as opposed to · (comparing from the universal to the particular) or induction nm,rin,u from the particular to the universal). 131 The example is a case because, while at the same time it belongs to and defines a it does so simultaneously as part of and yet outside the same it defines and to which it belongs. 132 Because there is no such absolute guilt, insofar as an accused is made an example of by and punished for the future possible actions of others he or help but be innocent. Yet, at the same time, he or she is guilty or her own past conduct making him or her simultaneously not belong wholly to both the categories of innocence and innocence, although perhaps miniscule in the scheme of is nevertheless critical. According to Rene Girard, innocence is in creating a social scapegoat in order to prevent recurrent because it renders the sacrificial ritual different from vengeance that way, arrests any spiral into endless mutually destructive through, for 'instance, vendettas without end. 133
Selective universality ,rJ1•etoric is therefore that humanity sits in judgment over inhumanthe selectivity of the cases, though, it would rather ~acct1rately put as one segment of humanity sits in judgment over . One cannot help but detect a note of amphiboly here where are exclusively responsible for all of humanity's very worst Such indiscriminating use of universal sets in international law (not just humanity, but closely related terms -the intercommunity and mankind) is under critiqued within the disciplack of sufficient critique is probably because those sets are what make the field itself intelligible and one cannot very well them and remain comfortably meaningful within the field. moreover are crucial and deployed at strategic moments in crucial in providing a basis for both galvanising action and g dissent and they are strategic in how they artfully structure the field into insiders and outsiders, while at the same time claiming to act on behalf of both. Moreover, this acting on the behalf of both involves selfselected active insiders acting against more or less passively acquiescent outsiders. The outsider, in terms of humanity, noneiheless remains human and part of humanity. This stands to reason because non-humans could never be guilty of inhumanit)'". These sets of sets therefore paradoxically include and exclude at the same time insiders and outsiders. The insiders are included as actors but excluded as the acted upon, while the outsiders are excluded as actors but included as the acted upon. Humanity therefore is the set of sets that simultaneously includes and excludes itself. That exclusive-inclusion and inclusive-exclusion dynamic is what makes the international system actually work in the first place, and without it the system is again unintelligible and paralysed. Universality is arguably at present a useful legal fiction that on occasion cloaks injustice. Suppose, for a moment, we entertain the somewhat unusual thought (elaborated below) that a secular sacrificial economy lies at the root of international criminal justice, what would it mean if, as according to Edward Carr, this ethical system were built on the sacrifice of the weaker brother?
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Africa is the example par excellence of the outside and Africans are the perennial outsiders. However, following from the argument outlined above, Africa and Africans constitute the international community's boundary as such via international criminal justice. In an empirical sense, Africans are the only ones currently under active investigation and trial at the ICC. This is not because of any deliberate intention of a prosecutor or any vast racial plot but follows through from the structure of a faith-based and piety-dependent criminal justice system where judges are not judged and trials are not tried. The reason why Africa is and shall remain the focus of international criminal law is that the boundary of the set of sets that is and contains humanity is underdeveloped and, in the interim, requires to be conjured up through configuring beings that are simultaneously outside and inside by insiders that are at the same time inside and outside. The beings tried are broadly familiar as sacrificial scapegoats while those doing the trying are familiar as sovereigns. A very specific form of scapegoating is done in international criminal law. The accused are supposed to bear the highest ,{l'~l>ponsiibil.ity for the worst crimes known to humanity. The selection of exclusively for this dubious honour, while not random, is definitely arbitrary. It is not random because there are real prima facie .grourrds indicating that persons from the region selected are responsible some way for the commission of absolutely heinous acts. It is arbihowever, because out of a total human population in the billions, few Africans selected do not have the monopoly on international <:riminallity (not even in Africa) and nor can they be singled out solely as very worst offenders. · ·· A completely reasonable counter'argument, however, could be made ··.that African states and African people are the most supportive group of the ICC. What is more, the African continent not only has the worst .
••crimes but, most significantly, also has the least infrastructure to deal these crimes. So is Africa and are Africans the sole focus of j•itlteicnatio•nal criminal law because of their high enthusiasm for inter>nati<)n~u criminal justice, culpability for international crimes or structural political weaknesses or some admixture of all three? Article 13 of the ;•,R:orrre Statute provides the trigger mechanism for the ICC's jurisdiction.
Article codifies three separate modes for exercising jurisdiction. The .first is the traditional basis of the consent of states. The second is through a referral of the United Nations Security Council by a resolution. 135 The third provides for an independent prosecutorial power to refer a case. The first and the third are directly derived from state consent and flow from specific Articles of the Rome Statute, 14 and 15 respectively. Plaiilly because all the modes of triggering jurisdiction have been exhausted exclusively in relation to Africa, it is both culpability and wealkness. That is precisely why the selection, while arbitrary, is not random. The inability to prosecute implies weakness but being unwilling to do so constitutes culpability. It would appear then that the pious hope by which punishment will surely follow crime is not perfectly congruent with this reality. Why is it that Africans appear to have the monopoly on the worst crimes that humanity has to offer along with the weakest infrastructure to deal with them? Coincidence? Or is this structural wealkness precisely why Africa is targeted rather than any others?
Another objection raised could be that the case often celebrated as heralding the birth, or beginning, of international criminal law (that of Peter von Hagenbach), is, after all, neither from Africa nor of an 135 UN Charter 1945, chapter VII.
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136 Likewise, the trials after the Second World War of the Nazis, the Imperial japanese and their Axis partners, were also nothing to do with Africa. Even more so, Italy, which could have provided some accused criminals for their wartime actions in Ethiopia, was not part these post-war trial processes.
137 Likewise, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Extraordinary Criminal Chambers for Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon also have no obvious bearing on African themes and issues. However, precisely those exceptional and therefore oft-cited cases make the point that now international criminal justice has been normalised by setting up a permanent court, the usual suspects are exclusively African and as yet not even exceptionally non-African. However, given the glacially developing trend whereby the exception gradually becomes the rule, 138 Africans are only the vanguard for a globalising international criminal justice. Indeed, Giorgio Agamben finds it unsurprising 'that there is a predilection to resort to exemplary punishment in a state of exception'. 139 The then prosecutor himself said that the 'court is really helping to establish a new idea in the world with state parties and non-state parties. It will take time. In 30 years, all the world will be a member of the court but in the meantime we are progressing.' 140 The Court thus starts with Africans in order to cut its teeth before promising to sink its talons into bigger prey. This is the point made again and again that a court that is yet to gain credibiliry and respect begins with going after the weakest and not necessarily the most criminal. Therefore, it targets Africans not because they are the worst but because they are the weakest. This is supposed somehow to redeem the whole of humanity, thus making Africa the perpetually scapegoated pharmakos that is given up and giving itself up to sacrifice in order to embody the international community through criminal justice. This is neither the time nor the space within which a and satisfactory explanation of such a complex and ig,l;ta11ding social phenomenon as the scapegoat mechanism can be ~idated. However, various writers from both inside and outside the 1ill1tim1al international criminal law canon may enrich the discussion some light on the particular concerns raised. characterisation 'universal justice' has the international commuperforming a seemingly external sacrifice (because the accused is out of the normal communal relations as a rogue, terrorist, pirate, , etc.). 141 On the other hand, the accused's community, which is the 'accused community', provides an internal scapegoat to redeem Socially unsanctioned violence violates that most sacred value $anctity of human life), which requires a sacrifice (trial and sentencing that produces a scapegoat 142 through the punishment of i.divid.uals as responsible for future collective breaches of the peace by Such ambivalent figures are conceptually similar to persons <wai<'u anathema. 143 The sacrificial economy particularly clarifies incluand exclusion mechanisms in the construction and reconstruction of relationship between the particular (a specific set of facts) and the unive1rsal (the general system oflaw). 145 This is intended to 'end impunity to prevent future crimes'. 146 The then prosecutor said that 'Kenya will provide a historic example on how one country chose to address and prevent massive crimes'; furthermore, 'Kenyans, including women, youth, tribal groups, judicial, political, and religious leaders have a role. This is their court.'
147 As per the then prosecutor's rhetoric, the international community is the community of communities in that it contains all Kenyan communities and individuals.
The then prosecutor's own original contribution to the Kenyan situation was to add exemplification as the means by which to achieve such a preventative approach to violence. He then proceeded to extend its effective reach from Kenya and Kenyans to the wider international community by saying: 'Kenya could be an example of how to manage this type of conflict because Kenya had a problem but Kenya stopped the crimes in two months. Now they have to do more to prevent repetition and ensure the next election is an example.'
148 This preventative exemplification to ward off violence thus became a running theme covering not just a specific election in time and space (Kenya in 2012) but also fifteen other elections elsewhere and at different times; moreover, all of them in the future:
The best example is Kenya. Justice for the post-electoral violence in Kenya will ensure a peaceful election in 2012. Additionally, it will send a clear message for the 15 elections to come in the region: violence during electoral times cannot be a tool to retain or to gain power; but it is a sure avenue towards a one-way ticket for prison in The Hague. That is the message we need to send in Kampala. futurity is linked to collective liability to scapegoat the accused by lpc>rtioning responsibility for what has not yet occurred and is by no certain to occur apparently on ultimate behalf of all of humanity. as though this is a liturgical exercise that has the then prosecutor fectiv,elv intoning: 'here judged today is the individual responsible for .communal violence you have suffered (and perpetrated) whom is punished. Peace be with you for now and ever more.' The recipients message of the trial as a spectacle shall, it is hoped, respond tftilrmatbrel:r: 'there, but for toeing the peaceful line, go 1'. And if violence to be no more, peace would surely follow. Once again: 'The results our investigations in the Kenya situation will be presented to the in December. We are preparing two cases against six individuals. cases could have a critical role to play in preventing violence in the election in Kenya and in another fifteen countries of the region.' 150 · exemplary preventative approach is to be achieved by only trying accused with the greatest responsibility for the worst crimes:
The investigation will focus on those most responsible for the most serious incidents. We will try to conduct an expeditious investigation, aiming to present a sample representative of the crimes committed. We envision at least twu cases against one to three persons in each case. We will focus on those who, according to the evidence that will be collected in the course of our independent investigation, are most responsible. 151 examining relevant national proceedings of potential cases proseCtJtOJrial policy seems to follow the same line of holding a few individuals \r<~pon:sihle for the mass by focussing on those who appear to bear the •. ·~realtest responsibility for the most serious crimes.
152 This approach is 'a]Jpliied in enabling the selection of cases based on 'persons most responor 'those bearing the greatest responsibility' but not making those standards legal preconditions for admissibility, which would be a hindrance to the then prosecutor. 153 The Assembly of State Parties to the ICC appears to endorse the view that the ICC has had to take a policy decision to focus prosecutions on 'those bearing the greatest responsi· bility for the most serious crimes' even though it is not prescribed in the Statute. 154 However, among professional criminologists there seems to be a broad consensus that the efficacy of punishment in acting as a general deterrent is not the most important factor in lowering crime rates. 155 Moreover, international criminal trials do little to deter violence or promote reconciliation. 156 Images and icons of the international community Tallgren proposes that perhaps the purpose of international criminal law is less the prevention or suppression of criminality than the establishment of symbols, which enable belief in a legitimate international community that can be governed analogously to the nation state. 157 Tallgren suggests one way to focus differently on international criminal justice is as a continuous remembrance service, akin to divine religious services, which meaningfully targets the questions of life and death, good and evil, as well as the promises of justice, peace and love.
158 Girard and Agamben have outlined the sacrificial and juridical logics inherent in such an 159 Lior Barshack, for one, conceives of the court as a social :chanism providing the centre of contemporary civil religion. 160 Both and Gregor Noll have noted before the proximities of sacrifice to and of the trial to the sacrifice. 161 Secularisation is inadequate as because it is the shifting (rather than abolition) of concepts one sphere (religion) to another (e.g. politics or law), consistently .w Lucu erstwhile function. 162 Secularisation can therefore mean the continuation of practices of religious origin, more or less r~cognisced or unacknowledged. 163 Presently, therefore, sacrifice as a fur1ctiion has shifted register in moving into law through politics theology. 'Aestheti•cs is central to law generally but international law in particular such central features structuring it, e.g. the aforementioned m'mil:v but also sovereignty, the rule of law, human rights, etc., can interacted with indirectly in terms of their positive (actual formanc<:) or negative (perceived lack) manifestation. This means all of its main principles and concepts are always presented but present in the real sense. That is to say, they are not to be found them.selves within the material physical realm open to the senses and by representation. This is because -it is believed -they be found either above or perhaps below but in any event beyond ',diire<:tly perceptible. Yet they remain in some normative sense the behind the representative 'facade'. This briefly passes for the ~theti<:s of law. The argument indicates that any efforts directed interacting with these necessarily transcendent concepts could grounded in a secular sacrificial economy. 164 That is to say, if trial works by displacing social and individual perceptions of guilt onto the accused (who is selected for his or her sins but not only for his or her sins is he or she punished but also those of others), then it displays an irrepressible sacrificial economy.
What is a sacrifice? core and collateral effects and affects
What would happen if a would-be sacrificial victim were given a voice? There are three examples of human sacrifice documented in the Christian Bible. To start with probably the least known, that of)ephthah of his daughter (we are not even told her name), who was sacrificed in exchange for victory in a war over the Ammonites by her father. Apparently, although unhappy, she accepted her fate quietly, and was duly sacrificed 165 The case of Abraham and his first-born son Isaac is probably more familiar than the first. Abraham was instructed to sacrifice Isaac to prove his piety towards God. While on the way to the altar when the unsuspecting son innocently inquired as to the whereabouts of the sacrificial lamb, he received the response that God would provide. Indeed, God did, but only after Abraham was about to slit his own son's throat as an offering. 166 We therefore are not told what view Isaac would have had of the proceedings had he been fully appraised of them beforehand. The last example is probably the most well-known and influential, where Jesus Christ, simultaneously both God and man, was given over in sacrifice by God his father to humanity in order to redeem that humanity. 167 Jesus, while fully aware of and initially willing to go along with the sacrificial elements of his death, nevertheless expressed some reluctance that was subsequently overcome to accept it. 168 More to the point, the last is a profoundly influential sacrifice because its daily ritual re-enactment and reaffirmation does not require an actual death but only simulates the original foundational sacrifice of Christ's crucifixion. One does not have to be a Christian believer to appreciate the value of a simulated death underpinning such a nevertheless efficacious sacrifice.
A sacrifice is therefore not a simple word at all. It requires at a bare minimum three elements: the person, animal or object offered up for sacrifice itself; the individual or community making the sacrifice; and the immaterial but representable idea, being or deity to whom the sacrifice is made. 169 The relationship between these various elements is an iditionallayer of complexity. The sacrifice and the person making the must be somehow connected without necessarily being identical. hereh1ticms:hip between the person making the sacrifice and the entity the sacrifice is addressed can only be representative. That is, indirect and uncertain. This interaction is therefore not one of exchange or a trading of favours, as it were, but more one of pplic:ati•:m, which if performed in the ritually correct manner promises about the desired response. Sa·criloce is a transcendental concept, which as such is a necessary na:tuc•n of possibility for the international criminal justice system. As the phenomenon of redemptive sacrifice is not new or even in its theological aspects to international law. 170 The elements of most relevant to international criminal justice are redemption, t.tln:err1ent, expiation and purification. Redemption connotes deliverance sin and damnation, including by atonement or expiation. Expiation a means by which redress (for a crime or offence) is made by an through, for instance, punishment. Atonement connotes restoror reconciliation of friendly relations by reparation of wrong or through making amends or providing satisfaction and, in that way, society of the pollution of the harm done. By empathising with sacrificial victims it is imperative to note that a atrihc:e, by its very nature, is just a performative exercise that is never true but only either efficaciously or inefficaciously performed. can never be any real sacrifices because it is all about figuratively Lindirect and therefore necessarily uncertain substitutions. They are all ;'silnulatiion.s, ritualised exercises to bind society through compelling specAs a virtual activity, therefore, they do not need the collateral real reJ>et:itiv·e spilling of blood, as it were, to impress their core moral or lessons upon pious or impious onlookers. The affective states trials are intended to produce on the audience are not directly linked their punitive effects on the accused.
Social catharsis
Richard Dawkins's notion of memetic transmission encapsulates nicely the cultural shifting of the trial-as-sacrifice by explaining how the descent (if not the origin) of law and the legal system from the sacred could occur. 171 The trial can be seen in the form of a morality tale rippling across space and time through a series of memes; peace is good and beneficial while war is bad and attended with prohibitive cost. The trial is subsequently installed as an archive and repository of communal values. By linking prosecution of the accused to achieving peace, the court makes the virtual sacrifice paradigmatic of the international criminal trial. The trial-as-sacrifice through the scapegoated pharrnakos provides both social bonding and the binding of violence. This is how international criminal trials build the international community up through instrumentalising empathy or identifying the self with the other in the dock, which enables formation of society via outlawry, etc. where the excluded provides the boundary for inclusion 172 To summarise the line of argument pursued to this point, the two limbs of the central ethical problem identified -the ambivalence of justice (by making an example of one from the past to others in the future) and ambiguity of universality (exclusive focus on Africa) -are linked by the pharmakos mechanism (explained below) through preventative approaches to legal justice. In the Kenyan case study chosen, both the Kenyans and the then prosecutor share a common faith in the value of this preventatively sacrificial economy in hopefully eradicating violence. If the Kenyans initiated the process, then the ICC prosecutor continued and extended it. Even so, as we will see below, defence counsel note it with alarm and, likewise, the then prosecutor actually charges some accused with practising it themselves. Therefore, in international criminal justice as social catharsis, the international community is making the sacrifice, Africans (who both belong to and are excluded from the international community) are the sacrifice, and the entity they are sacrificed to is a 'justice' that is never present but is only ever presented.
The paradox of individual criminal responsibility for mass communal violence has led defence counsel to go on record with misgivings about this approach on the basis that it is liable to generate scapegoats:
When it comes to crimes in Ituri, those who are the most powerful are spared. Thomas Lubanga is charged in place of those who should have been prosecuted, and so the accused is placed in an unacceptable situation. The International Criminal Court is put before an immense danger, a fearsome danger, because the International Criminal Court cannot prosecute all of the suspects. And because it can never prosecute all of the suspects, international criminal justice must necessarily face the temptation to convict by proxy those who are absent. The danger is 'tremendous, because beyond the prosecution of an individual, an attempt is made to prosecute a criminal phenomenon which is far greater than him. The accused then becomes or risks becoming a scapegoat. 173 expanded upon the idea portraying the as a scapegoat:
As regards scapegoats, we must ensure that the concept of individual criminal responsibility is applied. Only this vigilance on the principles and on the evidence c~ enable the International Criminal Court to meet the challenges of justice, the human and symbolic challenges inherent in any trial before it; and that double vigilance is all the more important, your Honours, in that in bringing before you to be judged Thomas Lubanga, and bringing before you Thomas Lubanga to be judged in the place of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed in Ituri, one is seeking to have you play a role which is not yours, one which cannot be yours, one which must not be yours. 174 spectre of the scapegoat also crops up in yet another case on this ><it'Oa,;iml, introduced by the prosecution this time, explicitly linked to the ·'ll<>ticon of sacrifice and as evidence to prove knowledge of serious crimes a~ainst a civilian population by the accused:
Witness 45 provides further details in regard to the trials. He states that none of the soldiers served a full prison sentence. The witness further states that Jean-Pierre Bemba reassured the ones tried that, and I quote: 'It was done for outside people, and after that they would be released.' ceremonies, liturgies, and insignia operate '-' 82 In being a cautionary example to others, the accused is a peace sacrifice in a literary, or figurative, or iconographic sense. This 'sacrifice for peace' element gives the entire international criminal trial a decidedly quasi-religious aspect with the trial standing in as a secular sacrifice that casts the accused as a social scapegoat for the preservation of peace. There are at least two challenges of representation here. One might be how to ground the real and immediate jurisdiction of the court over perpetually potential cases. The other is attendant upon portraying Africa as a terrain of, and Africans as a cipher for, all the worst of humanity's ills. The mysterious link between the two is the scapegoat!pharmakos mechanism already encountered in several instances above.
Although sacrifice links simultaneously both violence and trial in international criminal justice, nothing has as yet been written on it as being explanatory of Africa's peculiar position within it. This chapter noted the sacrificial economy of law not merely to note or even applaud its potentials and redemptive capacity, but it is also a directed critique suggesting that international criminal justice is all and only about affects and icons; that such a sacrificial economy of law could potentially be organised without any actual victims. One possible way towards this is to shift emphasis from law enforcement, aimed at redressing breaches once they occur, to law fulfilment, addressed at achieving the promise of the law before it is breached. 183 All we should unflinchingly acknowledge is the anarchic core of international justice where violence is both benediction and malediction simultaneously. Consequently short-term interventionist and, in the end, ineffectual responses to political violence should be abandoned. The study began by attempting a partial demystification of basic concepts in the panoply of international criminal justice, not in order to advocate abolishing or abandoning them immediately, but to suggest finally positive ethical transformations in their use in order to align those practices more closely to the aims of apportioning responsibility equitably, promoting reconciliation in affected communities, and encouraging remorse in convicted offenders in order to prevent the recurrence of political violence. This would hopefully bind the sacrificial logic, rhetoric and aesthetic of international criminal justice to an ethic of empathy that strives to be truly universal and truly just.
